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Tax Problems in Sales
to Controlled Corporations
Brian C. Ellis*
Mr. Ellis examines the tax consequences arising when a taxpayer
sells appreciated property to a controlled corporation in order to realize
a capital gain for himself as well as to increase the basis of the prop-
erty. He points out the dangers inherent in such a transaction and
suggests precautions which should be taken to obtain favorable tax
treatment. The author concludes that a taxpayer transferring appreci-
ated property to a controlled corporation may achieve substantial tax
benefits because of the relative ineffectiveness of sections 351 and 1239;
however, it will be almost impossible for a taxpayer to recognize a loss
on the transfer of depreciated property because of section 267.
I. INTRODUCTION
To a high bracket taxpayer, one of the most appealing methods
of saving taxes is the sale of property to a controlled' corporation
on a deferred payment basis. Such a sale has many potential tax
advantages. As compared with other tax saving techniques, it is a
relatively simple, uncomplicated transaction. Furthermore, since the
buyer is a controlled corporation the seller may obtain substantial
tax benefits without giving up any real control over the property
transferred. For example, at the cost of a capital gains tax,2 the seller
may transfer appreciated property to his corporation which will ob-
tain a stepped-up basis3 that can be offset against future ordinary
income of the corporation, either by way of increased depreciation
deductions or by a decreased gain on the future sale of the acquired
* Member, Florida Bar; L.L.B., University of Florida; L.L.M., New York University.
1. As used in this article, the term "control" refers simply to direct ownership of
a majority of the outstanding voting stock. Cf. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(c).
2. A sale to a controlled corporation ordinarily has no tax advantage if the seller's
gain would be taxed as ordinary income. Consequently, the seller must sell or exchange
either a capital asset held more than six months, or a "§ 1231 asset." See INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, §§ 1201, 1221, and 1231. However, property which the taxpayer holds
for sale and which forms an integral part of the taxpayer's business perhaps will not
be considered a capital asset even though the literal terms of § 1221 (definition of a
capital asset) are met. See, e.g., Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350
U.S. 46 (1955). But the courts have refused to apply this theory to the definition of
a § 1231 asset. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904
(Ct. Cl. 1961). The courts likewise have refused to define the term "sale or exchange"
in a manner different from the ordinary meaning of those words. See Commissioner v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
3. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 1012; Cf. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 362(a).
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asset. Furthermore, by electing installment sales treatment,4 payment
of the seller's tax on the gain may be deferred so that the timing of
the corporation's tax savings and the seller's tax payments will co-
incide.
If the property has depreciated in value, the seller may seek to
recognize a loss on the sale but at the same time retain control over
the property as a hedge against future market value increases. The
desired loss may be a capital loss 5 or an ordinary loss, 6 depending
on the character of the asset transferred. Other incidental benefits,
in either a gain or loss situation, include the deductibility by the
corporation of interest on the installment obligations given to acquire
the property, and the possibility that accumulation of income to
discharge the obligations may constitute a "reasonable need of the
business" for purposes of avoiding the accumulated earnings tax.8
To the seller of appreciated property, the depreciation recapture
provisions9 and the imputed interest provisions 0 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code may remove much of the tax profit from the sale. Never-
theless, sales to controlled corporations remain attractive in the case
of non-depreciable property such as land, depreciable personal prop-
erty with a substantial amount of pre-1962 depreciation, and de-
preciable realty that has been held for several years" or on which
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453.
5. Even if the loss is a capital loss, the taxpayer may offset up to $1,000 against
ordinary income in the year of sale and in future years if he has no capital gains for
those years (assuming the loss is otherwise deductible). INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §:
165(f), 1211, and 1212.
6. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 165(c). Section 267 ordinarily will prevent deduction
of a loss on sales to controlled corporations. See text accompanying note 149 infra.
7. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 163. If the seller uses the cash method, the corpora-
tion must actually pay the interest in order to obtain the deduction, even if the-
corporation uses the accrual method. TNT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 267(a) (2) and
(b)(1).
8. TNT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 531-37. But see United Business Corp. of America
v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1933). If the notes are considered stock,
accumulations for the purpose of redeeming the stock perhaps would not be considered
a "reasonable need of the business." Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Com--
missioner, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 306 (1959).
9. TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1245, 1250. In general, § 1245 requires that a
portion of the gain on the sale of personal property equal in amount to depreciation
deductions taken in 1962 and thereafter be treated as ordinary income. Section 1250,
in general, requires similar treatment on the sale of depreciable real property, al-,
though only as to post-1963 depreciation. See footnotes 11 & 12 infra, for other-
differences between § 1245 and § 1250.
10. TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 483. Generally, § 483 requires that the seller treat
a portion of each payment as interest, taxable as ordinary income, if the installment
obligations do not provide for payment of at least 4% simple interest. The corporation,
however, will obtain a deduction for any imputed interest (unless the provisions of
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 267(a)(2) apply). Treas. Reg. § 1.483-2(a)(1) (ii) (1966).
11. The amount of depreciation recaptured by § 1250 decreases by one percentage
point for each month during which the realty is held, after the 20th month. For-
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straight-line depreciation has been taken.'
A typical fact situation illustrating the potential tax benefits aris-
ing from a sale to a controlled corporation can be readily described.
Assume that an individual taxpayer in the 50 per cent bracket owns
land suitable for a housing development. The land cost the taxpayer
150,000 dollars and developers have offered the taxpayer as much as
500,000 dollars for the property. The taxpayer has never developed
property before13 but would like to develop this particular piece of
property himself. He realizes, however, that if he constructs houses
on the property and otherwise develops the property himself at a cost
of 250,000 dollars and is able to sell the entire property and the
houses for 1,000,000 dollars, he will have recognized a gain of 600,000
dollars which will be taxed- as ordinary income.14 Consequently, he
decides to form a new corporation with a minimum capitalization
and then sells the undeveloped land to the corporation for 500,000
dollars. The corporation will give its note in the face amount of
500,000 dollars payable over five years, with five per cent interest,
and will then develop the property and sell the houses. If every-
thing goes as planned, the taxpayer will have a realized gain of
350,000 dollars on the sale of the undeveloped land. Hopefully this
gain will be taxed as a capital gain and, under installment sales treat-
ment, will give rise to a capital gains tax on 70,000 dollars each year
for five years. The corporation then will borrow the 250,000 dollars
required to construct the houses from a financial institution, will con-
struct the houses and sell them for 1,000,000 dollars, realizing a gain
of 250,000 dollars, on which a tax of roughly 120,000 dollars would
be paid, thus leaving it with 130,000 dollars in cash after paying
back the 250,000 dollar loan from the bank and the 500,000 dollars
owed to the controlling shareholder.15 At this point, the controlling
shareholder might liquidate the corporation, obtaining the 130,000
dollars in cash and paying a capital gains tax on the difference be-
tween this amount and whatever amount he chose to contribute to
example, if a building has been held for five years before its sale, only sixty percent
of the "additional depreciation" (see note 12 infra) would be subject to recapture (40
months x 1% = 40%; 100% - 40% = 60%). If held for ten or more years,
there would be no recapture. There is no similar limitation in § 1245.
12. Under § 1250(b) (1), only depreciation in excess of the depreciation that would
have been taken if the straight line method bad been used is recaptured.
13. If the taxpayer previously developed property, his gain on the sale would be
taxed as ordinary income because he then would be in the business of developing real
property. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1221(1). Thus there would be no particular
tax advantage to the sale.
14. The taxpayer would be considered to hold the property primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his business and hence § 1221(1) would require
that the proceeds be taxed as ordinary income.
15. For purposes of simplicity, these computations ignore the interest payments
that would have been made to the bank and the shareholder.
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the corporation at the time it was organized. 16 Thus, after the trans-
action is completed, the taxpayer will have obtained 500,000 dollars
in payments on his notes, on which he will have paid a tax of approxi-
mately 87,500 dollars. Furthermore, he will have received 130,000
dollars at liquidation, on which he will have paid a tax of approxi-
mately 32,500 dollars. After taxes, the taxpayer will have realized
net proceeds of 510,000 dollars.
If the taxpayer instead had chosen to transfer the land to the
corporation in a section 351 transfer, the corporation would have
taken his basis (150,000 dollars) for the property, and, after spend-
ing 250,000 dollars to develop the land and construct the houses,
would have had an increased basis of 400,000 dollars. Thus when
the property subsequently was sold, a gain of 600,000 dollars would
have been realized, on which a tax of 288,000 dollars would have
been paid. After paying back the 250,000 dollar loan, the corpora-
tion would have been left with 462,000 dollars but the controlling
shareholder would have taken no cash out of the corporation. If the
462,000 dollars had, over a five-year period, been distributed to him
as a dividend rather than as payment on the corporation's notes, he
would have paid a tax of 231,000 dollars (assuming a 50 per cent
bracket taxpayer) on this amount, leaving him with only 231,000
dollars after taxes, as compared with 510,000 dollars under the sales
method. Thus there is an after-tax difference to the controlling share-
holder of 279,000 dollars if the property is sold to the corporation
rather than being transferred to it at the time the corporation is
organized in exchange for the corporation's stock.
In view of the potential tax benefits, it is not surprising that the
Commissioner, with but slight help from Congress, has developed a
number of weapons to attack sales to controlled corporations. This
article will examine these weapons and suggest possible methods of
combating them.
II. SALE OF P.RorEry THAT HAS APPBEcIATED iN VALUE
A. Section 1239
The only statutory provision that specifically deals with sales at a
gain to controlled corporations is section 1239.17 This section causes
gain on the sale of depreciable property'8 between an individual
16. Under § 358 of the Internal Revenue Code, his stock basis would be equal to,
the amount he transferred to the corporation in exchange for the stock.
17. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1239.
18. Section 1239 will apply to depreciable property even though depreciation,
deductions with respect to the property have not in fact been taken. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Commissioner, 372 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1967). See IN'r
REv. CODE of 1954, § 167, for the definition of "depreciable property."
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and a controlled corporation to be treated as ordinary income, even
though a capital asset or a section 1231 asset is sold. For this pur-
pose, "control" means ownership of more than 80 per cent in value
of the outstanding stock, and an individual is considered to own stock
owned by his spouse, his minor children, and minor grandchildren.
For example, if a husband and wife each owned 50 per cent of a
corporation's outstanding stock for section 1239 purposes each would
be considered to own 100 per cent of the stock.
Because of its somewhat limited application, section 1239 has
not been a particularly potent weapon in the Commissioner's hands.
The purpose of enacting section 1239 was to prevent the corporation
from obtaining a stepped-up basis against which future depreciation
deductions could be taken, while the seller paid only a capital gains
tax on the sale. 9 Since land is not depreciable, and since the "evil"
at which the statute is aimed is a stepped-up basis for depreciation
purposes, at the cost of only a capital gains tax to the seller, the
statute was made inapplicable to land. This is somewhat surprising
since essentially the same tax advantages which section 1239 seeks
to deny can be obtained if land suitable for development is sold to
a controlled corporation. The corporation can develop and sell the
land, using the stepped-up basis to offset ordinary income received
on the sales. Indeed, many of the sales cases discussed below in-
volve just this situation. It is difficult to understand why Congress
thought it more reprehensible to offset ordinary income by depreci-
ation deductions than by sales of the assets, but whatever the reason,
omission of non-depreciable property from section 1239 certainly
leaves a broad gap in the statute's coverage.
Not only is the section limited to depreciable property, but the
attribution rules contained in section 1239 also are extremely limited.
Unlike other attribution provisions,'0 section 1239 does not treat
an individual as owning stock actually owned by his parents, his
brothers and sisters, his adult children, a trust of which he is the
beneficiary, a partnership in which he is a member, or a corporation
which he controls. Instead, an individual is treated as owning only
stock owned by his spouse, minor children, and minor grandchildren.
These limited attribution rules, coupled with the high, 80 per cent
ownership requirements"1 make section 1239 relatively easy to avoid
even when depreciable property is involved.
It is interesting to note that, as originally passed by the House of
Representatives in 1951, section 1239 would have been much more
19. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1951).
20. See, e.g., INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 267(c), 318.
21. Cf. INr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1235(d) (1), which requires only 25% ownership
in order for sales of patents to a corporation to be denied capital gains treatment.
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difficult to avoid. Under the House version, the ownership require-
ments were only 50 per cent and broad attribution rules would have
included the omitted relationships discussed in the preceding para-
graph.22 However, the Senate Finance Committee rejected present
section 1239 in its entirety.2 When restored by the Conference Com-
mittee, it contained its present high ownership requirements and
limited attribution rules, presumably as a compromise between mem-
bers of the House and Senate.2 Consequently, in its present form
section 1239 generally can be avoided with no practical loss of con-
trol over the corporation.
However, a recent decision by the Fifth Circuit, United States v.
Parkers may make section 1239 more difficult to avoid. In Parker
the selling shareholder owned exactly 80 per cent of a corporation's
stock. A corporate employee owned the remaining 20 per cent. The
employee's stock was subject to two restrictions: (1) an ordinary
"right of first refusar' agreement between the employee and the
corporation, requiring the employee to offer his stock for sale to the
corporation before selling it to a third party; and (2) a provision
requiring the employee to sell his stock to the majority shareholder
at a particular price if the employee terminated his employment.
The majority shareholder's stock also was subject to the right of first
refusal but was not subject to the second restriction.
The Fifth Circuit first noted that section 1239 applies if the selling
shareholder owns more than 80 per cent in value of the corporation's
outstanding stock. The court then held that, while the majority share-
holder did not own more than 80 per cent in number of the total out-
standing shares, his stock exceeded 80 per cent of the total value be-
cause the remaining 20 per cent was subject to the two restrictions
noted above. Not only did the above restrictions decrease the value
of the stock held by the employee, but the court also held that, even
without these restrictions, the majority shareholder's stock would
represent more than 80 per cent of the total value of the outstanding
stock simply by reason of the control element inherent in owning a
majority of the outstanding stock.
The wording of section 1239 makes it difficult to quarrel with the
result reached in Parker,6 but the decision raises problems that un-
22. Internal Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 328(a), 65 Stat. 504.
23. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 69-70 (1951).
24. H.R. REP. No. 1179, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1951).
25. 376 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1967).
26. While the result reached is probably correct, it is questionable whether
Congress gave a great deal of thought to the use of value as the determining factor
under § 1239. The committee reports give no explanation as to why value was used,
and the examples given in the reports all refer to the number of shares owned by
the seller, not to the value of those shares. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 120-21 (1951).
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doubtedly will cause majority shareholders to think twice before de-
ciding that section 1239 is inapplicable simply because they own 80
per cent or less of the total number of outstanding shares. For
example, in Parker it was unnecessary to determine the exact dollar
increase in value resulting from the control factor. Exactly 80 per cent
of the stock was owned by the majority shareholder. Hence any value
increase, no matter how slight, was sufficient to push him over the
80 per cent line drawn by section 1239. However, the control theory
would be equally applicable where a shareholder owned only 51 per
cent of the outstanding stock of the corporation.-7 In this situation,
presumably an attorney would have to determine the exact dollar
amount by which control increases the value of each share before
deciding whether section 1239 is applicable. While the valuation
problem is frequently encountered in estate tax cases, it is not neces-
sarily a burdensome requirement there because predictability is not
required. In the income tax area, however, a taxpayer wishes to have
some degree of certainty as to the tax consequences of a proposed
transaction. The desired certainty could not be obtained through a
ruling because valuation is a question of fact, and the Internal Rev-
enue Service normally will not issue advance rulings on factual ques-
tions.28 Consequently, under Parker an attorney must attempt to
predict the exact value increase resulting from control in a potential
section 1239 transaction. This obviously will be difficult to do, at
least with the degree of certainty that a taxpayer may require.
Thus Parker should have a considerable in terrorem effect on sales
by majority shareholders to their controlled corporations.
29
While Parker at least implied that section 1239 would apply in
any case where the taxpayer was within a few percentage points of
the 80 per cent line, the Tax Court, in Trotz v. Commissioner,"0
has held that section 1239 was inapplicable where a taxpayer owned
79 per cent of the stock in his corporation. Here, as in Parker, an
27. While Parker literally could apply where the seller owns only 51% of the
corporation's stock, the government's traditional opposition, in estate tax cases, to
substantial value discounts for minority interests might limit practical application of the
Parker theory to situations where close to 80% in number of the outstanding stock is
owned by the selling shareholder.
28. Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964-2 Csm. BULL. 947. See Note, Federal Tax Rulings:
Procedure and Policy, 21 VAmN. L. REV. 78 (1967).
29. Not only will Parker be significant in § 1239 cases, but the theory of the case
should be equally applicable to a wide variety of tax provisions that require a certain
percentage of the value of outstanding stock to be owned by a particular person.
For example, INT. Inv. CoDE of 1954, § 341 (collapsible corporations), § 541
(personal holding companies), and § 318 (attributioii rules), all involve a given per-
centage of the total value of outstanding stock owned by a particular person. This
is by no means a complete list of all Code provisions affected by Parker, but it does
illustrate the potential ramifications of that case.
30. P-H 1967 TAx CT. REPn. & MEm. DEc. ff 67,139.
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unrelated employee owned the remaining stock and his stock was
subject to the taxpayer's option to purchase at a fixed price if the
employee left the company. The Tax Court first held3' that section
1239 applied because the taxpayer in substance owned the employee's
stock. This theory was based on the taxpayer's right to terminate the
employee's relationship with the corporation at any time, thereby
bringing the option into effect. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected
the Tax Court's "substantial ownership" theory,2 holding that section
1239 required legal title to more than 80 per cent of the stock, not
control over more than 80 per cent. However, the Tenth Circuit re-
manded the case so that the Tax Court could resolve the factual
question of whether the 79 per cent interest which the taxpayer did
own was worth more than 80 per cent in value of the outstanding
stock. On remand the Tax Court held that the taxpayer's 79 per
cent interest did not exceed 80 per cent in value of the outstanding
stock.
The Tax Court's holding was based on a factual finding that the
control factor added nothing to the value of the taxpayer's stock
because a prospective purchaser would not be interested in acquir-
ing the corporation as a going concern for reasons peculiar to
the corporation's business. This would seldom be true, however.
Normally the value of a going business is more than simply the
value of its underlying assets. Presumably in the more normal case
the Tax Court would hold that control does increase value, although
the exact amount of that increase would be a question of fact in each
particular case.
Aside from a Parker or a Trotz situation, however, section 1239
can be avoided by giving a sufficient amount of stock in the corpora-
tion to adult children, parents, brothers, or sisters, in order to avoid
the 80 per cent ownership requirement. This general method was
approved by the Tax Court in Drybrough v. Commissioner,;3 against
the Commissioner's contention that the gift of a 40 per cent interest
in the corporation to an adult son shortly before the sale was a sham.
Although the gift was made "principally, if not solely, because of the
tax advantages to be derived,"34 the court found that the gift was
31. Trotz v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 127 (1965).
32. Trotz v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1966). In arguing that the
word "owns" in § 1239 is not limited to ownership through legal title but includes
"substantial ownership," the Service was, to some extent, taking a position inconsistent
with its own published rulings. In Rev. Rul. 56-613, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 212, the
Service held that the word "ownership" as used in § 368(c) includes only ownership
by way of legal title so that a parent corporation was not considered as "owning" stock
to which its subsidiary held legal title. This, of course, was in a situation where the
taxpayer desired to expand the definition of "ownership."
33. 42 T.C. 1029, rev'd on other grounds, 376 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1967).
34. Id. at 1048.
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valid under local law so that "whether or not the transfer was
motivated by tax savings, it was in substance what it purported to be
in form. .. ."35 In Drybrough there is no indication that the son ever
returned the stock to his father after the sale. The Commissioner's
sham argument would have considerably more strength in a situation
where there would be a mere temporary loss of 80 per cent owner-
ship. However, since a taxpayer will exercise practical control over
the corporation whether he owns 51 per cent or 81 per cent of the
voting stock, and normally would have a considerable degree of
control over any donee, there should be little need for the donee to
transfer the stock back to the controlling shareholder after the sale
has been effected.
If the taxpayer has no adult children or other family members to
whom stock can be given without attribution, he can instead transfer
the stock to a trust, naming minor children or his wife as beneficiaries.
While an outright transfer to a wife or minor child would be of no
help since section 1239 would attribute ownership of the stock to
the donor, the Fourth Circuit, in Mitchell v. Commissioner,0 held
that beneficial ownership is not within section 1239. In so holding,
the court held invalid a provision of the regulations which states that
beneficial ownership by a family member specified in section 1239
will cause attribution of the beneficially owned stock.3 The court
relied primarily on the legislative history of section 1239,- and on
the fact that an individual cannot exercise the same degree of control
over an independent trustee that he can over his minor children.
The decision seems correct, and yet the attribution rules become al-
most meaningless if they may be avoided by the simple expedient of
a transfer in trust.
In Mitchell the trustee was a bank, and the beneficiaries were the
taxpayer's minor children. Suppose, however, that the taxpayer him-
self was the trustee, or that he appointed an independent trustee but
named himself as the beneficiary. Would a different result be
reached? Certainly the taxpayer could not himself serve as trustee
and hope to avoid section 1239 because then he would retain legal
title to the stock transferred in trust, and Mitchell holds that legal
title is the important factor under section 1239. But carried to its
logical extreme, Mitchell presumably would permit the taxpayer to
name himself as beneficiary because the case holds that beneficial
35. Id.
36. 300 F.2d 533 (4th Cir. 1962).
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.1239-1 (1957).
38. As originally passed by the House of Representatives, the present § 1239
specifically provided that stock owned by a trust would be considered as owned
proportionately by its beneficiaries. This provision, among others, was omitted by the
Conference Committee from the final version of § 1239.
[ VOL. 21
TAX PROBLEMS
ownership is to be disregarded under section 1239. Moreover, the
taxpayer as beneficiary would exercise no greater control over an
independent trustee than would the taxpayer as grantor of the trust.
Finally, if the taxpayer does not wish to avoid section 1239 by
the above methods, he may always do so simply by transferring non-
depreciable property to the corporation.
In summary, section 1239, rather than actually inhibiting sales to
a controlled corporation, instead serves primarily as a trap for the
unwary. While taxpayers have, on occasion, been caught by this
trap, section 1239 should present no real problem for the sophisti-
cated taxpayer, with the possible exception of a Parker situation.
B. Section 351
1. Ownership lequirement.-Because of the ease with which tax-
payers have avoided section 1239, the Commissioner has largely re-
sorted to other methods of combating sales to controlled corporations.
Of these methods, section 35140 has been used most often. However,
because section 351 was not enacted for the specific purpose of in-
hibiting sales to controlled corporations, the Commissioner has fre-
quently encountered difficulty in applying section 351 to the problem
at hand.
Section 351 provides that, if taxpayers transfer "property" to a
corporation solely in exchange for stock or securities, and immediately
after the transfer the transferors of property "control" the corporation,
then no gain or loss will be recognized to the transferors and the
corporation will take the transferors' basis for the property received.
41
If property other than stock or securities is received, gain (but not
loss) will be recognized in an amount generally equal to the value
of such other property.4
"Control" is defined as ownership of at least 80 per cent of the
outstanding voting stock, and at least 80 per cent of each class of any
outstanding non-voting stock.43 The definition of control for section
39. See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Commissioner, 372 F.2d 281
(2d Cir. 1967), where the taxpayer was so concerned with a collapsible corporation
problem that he seemingly overlooked the existence of § 1239.
40. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 351.
41. INr. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 351(a), 362(a). Prior to enactment of present §
351, the courts held that gain was recognized when a corporation was formed by
transferring property that had appreciated in value. Livingston v. Commissioner, 18
B.T.A. 1184 (1930).
42. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 351(b). If the realized gain is less than the fair
market value of the other property, only the realized gain will be recognized.
43. INT. R v. CODE of 1954, § 368(c). If there are two or more classes of non-
voting stock, § 368(c) itself is not entirely clear whether 80% of each class must be
owned or whether the shareholder's combined ownership of both classes must equal
80% of the total non-voting stock. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that 80%
of each class must be owned. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 Curm. BULL. 115.
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351 purposes is to be contrasted with the definition of that term in
section 1239. Under section 351, at least 80 per cent must be owned,
while section 1239 requires more than 80 per cent ownership. Furth-
ermore, section 351 requires that 80 percent in number be owned,
while section 1239 requires 80 per cent in value. However, the
Parker case may render these distinctions meaningless. If a share-
holder owns exactly 80 per cent in number, Parker seemingly holds
that he necessarily owns more than 80 per cent in value, and so the
shareholder would be within both sections.
This latter point is of more than academic interest. Under section
351, if property other than stock and securities is received by the
transferor, then the transferor recognizes gain to the extent of the
value of the "other property."44 Normally the character of the prop-
erty transferred would control whether the recognized gain would
be taxed as capital gain or ordinary income. However, the Internal
Revenue Service4O 5 and the Tax Court 6 have held that, if section 1239
is otherwise applicable, then any gain recognized on a section 351
transfer must be taxed as ordinary income. Prior to Parker, it might
have been hoped that section 1239 could be avoided on a section 351
transfer if the transferor owned exactly 80 per cent of the stock,
since section 1239 speaks of "more than" 80 per cent ownership. As
mentioned above, Parker should put an end to any such hopes.
It is apparent that if section 351 applies to a purported sale be-
tween an individual and his controlled corporation the seller will not
obtain the desired tax benefits. First, the corporation will not obtain
a stepped-up basis for the acquired property, but instead will take
the transferor's basis. Thus the corporation receives no greater depre-
ciation deductions than the transferor would have received. In the
case of non-depreciable property, the corporation will realize the same
amount of gain on a subsequent sale of the transferred property as
the transferor would have realized. Second, payments made on the
notes given by the corporation to acquire the property may be treated
as dividends to the transferor, taxable as ordinary income, rather than
as the proceeds of a sale, taxable as capital gains. Thus the "seller"
loses his capital gains on the transfer and the entire transaction,
rather than being a tax bonanza, may turn into a positive disaster.
While the disadvantages of section 351 applying to a sale are
readily apparent, it is also apparent that the Commissioner may have
considerable difficulty in applying section 351 to a taxpayer who
casts his transfer in the form of a sale. Of course if the requirements
of section 351 are otherwise met, and the "seller" seeks to avoid that
44. See note 42 supra.
45. Rev. Rul. 60-302, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 223.
46. Weaver v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 411 (1959).
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section simply by forming the corporation in a section 351 transfer
and shortly thereafter "selling" the property to the newly-formed
corporation, the Commissioner should have little difficulty in show-
ing that the later sale was an integral part of the corporation's forma-
tion, so that the two steps (organization and sale) were effectively
a single section 351 transfer. For example, in one early case47 the
taxpayers (husband and wife) formed a corporation by transferring
86,000 dollars in cash and receiving all of the outstanding stock in ex-
change. A few days after its organization, the corporation used 80,000
dollars of this cash to "purchase" land from the taxpayers. The Com-
missioner argued, and the court held, that in substance the land had
been transferred to the corporation in exchange for its stock. Hence
present section 351 applied to the transfer and the sellers' loss was
denied.
48
While the Commissioner will have little difficulty in a case such
as this, where the terms of section 351 clearly are met and the only
problem is consolidating two ostensibly separate transfers, the terms
of section 351 often may present the Commissioner with a more
formidable problem. Perhaps the most obvious problem is the some-
what stringent "control" requirement of section 351. If the seller
does not own 80 per cent of the outstanding voting stock and 80
per cent of each class of outstanding non-voting stock, then by its
terms section 351 is inapplicable to the sale. Thus if the seller owns
100 per cent of the voting stock, but only 79 per cent of the non-
voting stock, section 351 cannot be used by the Commissioner to
attack the sale.49
However, in some situations where control is technically absent
at the time of sale the Commissioner might use the "step transaction"
doctrine" to bring the seller within the terms of section 351. For
example, in Houcks v. Hinds,51 an attorney for the taxpayer organized
a corporation by paying 1,000 dollars in exchange for all the out-
standing stock. Shortly thereafter the corporation purchased assets
of the taxpayer's partnership by giving a note for 582,000 dollars. At
the time of the sale, all the stock in the purchasing corporation was
still owned by the attorney. But about fifteen days later the attorney
sold all of his stock to the partnership for 1,000 dollars. The tax-
47. Labrot v. Burnet, 57 F.2d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
48. This case arose prior to enactment of present § 267, which would disallow the
loss in Labrot even if § 351 was inapplicable. See text accompanying notes 149-55
infra.
49. The Commissioner might argue that the "sale" actually constituted a contribution
to capital, however. See text accompanying notes 140-48 infra.
50. The gist of the "step transaction" doctrine is that a single transaction may not
be separated into two or more separate steps solely to avoid the tax consequences that
would result if the transaction was consummated by a single step.
51. 215 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1954).
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payer argued that section 351 was inapplicable because, at the time of
the sale, the partnership owned no stock in the corporation. How-
ever, the court held that the sale of assets to the corporation and the
succession to corporate ownership by the partnership were but two
related steps in a single plan so that the control requirement was met.
Consequently, section 351 applied to the sale.
In this area, application of the "step transaction" doctrine is prob-
ably not limited to cases where the seller never controlled the corpo-
ration until some time after the sale. If the taxpayer at one time
controlled the corporation but, in anticipation of the sale, disposed
of a sufficient amount of stock to avoid having control at the time
of the sale, the "step transaction" argument is certainly available to
the Commissioner. This is particularly true if the stock is disposed
of by way of a gift to a member of the seller's family.52
While deliberate loss of control in anticipation of the sale probably
would not effectively avoid the control requirement, consideration
might be given to causing an existing controlled corporation to form
a subsidiary, with the controlling individual shareholder then selling
to the subsidiary rather than to the parent. In this situation the
literal terms of section 368(c), 3 the control provision, would not be
met because the seller would own no stock in the acquiring corpo-
ration (the subsidiary) and section 368(c) requires ownership of
80 per cent of the outstanding stock of the acquiring corporation.
The attribution rules of section 318 - are not applicable to section
351 so that the parent's ownership of the subsidiary's stock would
not be attributed to the individual shareholder.55 While the seller
certainly would have practical control over the subsidiary, the Service
has ruled that section 368(c) requires direct ownership, not practical
control.5 1 However, in Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner,57 a tax-
payer attempted to avoid the control requirement in a manner similar
to that outlined above, but the Commissioner successfully argued that
the control requirement nevertheless was met. In this case, three tax-
payers caused members of their family to form a corporation by trans-
52. But cf. Drybrough v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1029, rev'd on other grounds, 376
F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1967).
53. NIT. REv. ConE of 1954, § 368(c).
54. INT. REv. CODE; of 1954, § 318.
55. Section 318 is inapplicable unless specifically incorporated by a particular Code
section. See the opening words of § 318(a). Section 351 does not incorporate § 318.
56. Rev. Rul. 56-613, 1956-2 Cum. BuLL. 212. This ruling involved the "control"
requirement for purposes of a "B" reorganization (INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368(a)
(1) (B) ), not the "control" requirement of § 351. However, § 368 (c) defines "control"
for purposes of the reorganization provisions as well as for § 351, and it would be
difficult for the Service validly to construe the same Code provision in two different
ways.
57. 43 T.C. 635 (1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1966).
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ferring approximately 4,000 dollars in cash to it in exchange for all
of the corporation's stock. The three taxpayers then proceeded to
"sell" undeveloped land to the corporation in exchange for the corpo-
ration's notes in a face amount of 330,000 dollars. The taxpayers
argued that the transfer was not within section 351 because they
owned no stock in the corporation and hence could not control it
under section 368(c). However, the Tax Court held that the sale was
an integral part of the corporation's organization, and hence the
organization and "sale" should be .considered a single transaction.
The court further found that the notes given by the corporation
actually constituted stock. Having made these two findings, the court
was then able to bring the "sellers" within section 351 because the
"transferors of property"58 (i.e., the members of the taxpayers' family
and the taxpayers themselves) did in fact control the corporation.
Aside from a Burr Oaks argument, it is quite possible that the
"sale" to the subsidiary would be treated by the Commissioner as a
contribution of capital to the parent, followed by a transfer of the
property by the parent to the subsidiary in exchange for the notes,
and a distribution of the notes by the parent to the individual share-
holder. Thus the parent would take the shareholder's basis for the
property,59 the subsidiary would take the parent's basis for the prop-
erty,60 the parent would pay no tax on receipt of the notes,61 and
distribution of the notes would be treated as a dividend distribution
by the parent to the individual shareholder 62 taxable as ordinary in-
come. While this recasting of the transaction might well be accepted
by a court if the subsidiary was formed solely to permit the individual
shareholder to avoid the "contror provision, the taxpayer would be
in a better position if a valid business purpose could be established
for the subsidiary's existence.
2. Property Requirement of Section 351.-In order for section 351
to apply, the controlling shareholder must transfer "property" to the
corporation. While the definition of "property" has raised occasional
problems,63 there normally would be no such problems in the sales
area. The problems that have arisen usually involve the question of
whether intangible items such as "know-how" or secret processes
constitute "property" and so may be transferred to a controlled corpo-
58. The term "property" under § 351 includes cash. Ha]Iiburton v. Commissioner,
78 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1935).
59. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 362(a).
60. Id.
61. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 351.
62. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 301.
63. See, e.g., Fahs v. Florida Mach. & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948);
cf. Roberts Co. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1 (1945).
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ration at no tax cost under section 351.64 Such items may not be
depreciated because they have an indeterminate useful life.65 Nor
would secret processes, "know-how," and similar items normally be
sold at a later date by the acquiring corporation. Since the primary
purpose of a sale to a controlled corporation is to give the corpora-
tion a stepped-up basis against which future deductions can be taken,
or which can be offset against the proceeds from later sales of the
property, it is apparent that there would be little tax incentive to
"sell" secret processes, "know-how," and similar items to a controlled
corporation. Usually more tangible items such as land, buildings, ma-
chinery, and equipment would be "sold" to a controlled corporation.
There is no question but that these latter items constitute "property"
for section 351 purposes.
Not only does section 351 require that "property" be transferred
to a "controlled" corporation, but the transferor also must control the
corporation "immediately after" the transfer. The term "immediately
after," like the definition of "property," has given rise to problems in
cases where, as an integral part of the transfer, a transferor loses con-
trol of the corporation shortly after the transfer.66 This normally
would not be a problem in a sales case since it is unlikely that, as
an integral part of the sale, the seller would lose control of the
corporation.
3. Stock, Securities, or "Other Property."-As discussed above, the
Commissioner may have difficulty in treating the sale as a section
351 transfer because the control provisions of section 351 are some-
what stringent. But the term "property" and the requirement that
the transferor control the corporation "immediately after" the trans-
fer will not present a problem in the normal sales case. Thus if the
"control" requirement is met, the Commissioner's next problem is
classifying the consideration received by the seller as "stock or se-
curities" of the acquiring corporation.
If the acquiring corporation rays cash for the property it is clear
that the "stock or securities" requirement would not be met and sec-
tion 351 could not apply.67 However, the acquiring corporation in
most sales cases is seldom in a position to make an immediate cash
64. See Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 CGu. BULL. 133. Another problem has been the
question of whether the stock was issued for services rather than for property. Fahs
v. Florida Mach. & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948). This problem obvi-
ously is not applicable in the sales area.
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)(3) (1960).
66. Commissioner v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955);
American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948).
67. In such a situation, the Commissioner might treat the "sale" as a contribution to




payment for the property. And even in the rare case where the
corporation is financially able to pay cash, the selling shareholder
frequently will not want a lump sum payment because the entire
tax on his gain would be due in the year of transfer, whereas de-
ferred payment will permit the seller to elect the installment method
of reporting his gain.68 For these reasons, the corporation will almost
always give a deferred payment obligation of some sort in exchange
for the property. The corporate obligation given may be classified
as a security, as stock, or as "other property" for section 351 purposes,
and the classification will determine the tax treatment accorded the
shareholder and, to some extent, the corporation.
4. Securities or "Other Property?"-The taxpayer initially may argue
that, while the "sale" may be a section 351 transfer, still the notes
constitute "other property" rather than stock or securities.69 If this
argument is successful then it may make little difference to him that
the sale is treated as a section 351 transfer because the tax results
are essentially the same.70 The "seller" will recognize a gain equal
to the difference between his basis for the property transferred and
the value of the corporate notes (i.e. the "other property").71 The
gain will be a capital gain if section 1239 is inapplicable72 and if the
capital gain requirements are otherwise met. Section 48373 may treat
a portion of the deferred payments as interest, taxable as ordinary
income to the seller, but this is true whether section 351 applies or not.
While the major tax benefits will be obtained whether the transfer
is considered a sale or a section 351 "boot" transaction, there is more
than a semantic difference between the two theories. Of most im-
portance is a possible loss of the installment method of reporting
gain if the "sale" is treated as a section 351 transfer. Some commen-
tators have suggested that a section 351 "boot" transfer is not eligible
for installment sales treatment,74 although no reasons have been given
for this position. There is nothing in the installment sale provision
itself 75 which states that it could not be used in connection with sec-
68. See note 4 supra.
69. See, e.g., Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.
1956).
70. This is not true if the "seller" is attempting to recognize a potential loss.
See text accompanying notes 149-55 infra.
71. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 351(b).
72. If § 1239 does apply, the Service has ruled that gain recognized under § 351(b)
will be taxed as ordinary income. Rev. Rul. 60-302, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 223.
73. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 483.
74. Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders, 16 TAx L. Rxv. 1, 54 (1960).
75. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453(b). If personal property is transferred, the sales
price must exceed $1,000, the property must not be inventory, and payments in the
year of transfer must not exceed 309o of the selling price. If real property is transferred,
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lion 351, as long as its requirements are met. Also, the provision ap-
plies not only to sales but also to "other dispositions." The latter
term seems sufficiently broad to cover a section 351 transfer.
Even if the installment sales provision cannot be elected on a
"boot" transfer, the taxpayer might argue that the corporate notes
have no readily ascertainable value so that gain is reported only as
payments are actually made on the notes and only after the actual
payments exceed the transferor's basis for the property transferred.
This treatment was first permitted by the Supreme Court in Burnet
v. Logan76 and since has become a recognized principle of tax law.
It is usually permitted if the note is non-negotiable, at least if the
taxpayer uses the cash method,7 although the Fifth Circuit takes the
position that a promise to pay may have a readily ascertainable value
even if represented by no note at all.18 Also, the Internal Revenue
Service has stated that, "except in rare and extraordinary cases,"
it will require valuation of contracts and claims to receive even indef-
inite amounts of income. 9 Consequently, a taxpayer seeking to defer
his tax payment by using the Logan theory must be prepared to
litigate the question.
Another possible disadvantage to a section 351 "boot" transfer as
opposed to a sale involves the corporation's allocation of basis to the
property transferred. If the seller sells a single item of property to
the corporation, the corporation's basis for that property equals the
face amount of the note given in exchange. 80 However, if the sale
is treated as an integral part of the corporation's formation so that it
is within section 351, then the corporation takes the transferor's basis
for all the property transferred, increased by the gain recognized by
the transferor. This gain presumably must be allocated among all of
the properties received by the corporation,81 both the property "sold"
the transfer must constitute a "casual sale or other casual disposition," and payments
in the year of sale must not exceed 30% of the selling price.
76. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
77. See, e.g., Williams v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1000 (1957). But see Kuehner
v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1954); Loyer v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d
452 (6th Cir. 1952).
78. Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
79. Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 15. But cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(c)(2)
(1966), where the Service's position is that non-qualified stock options granted to a
corporate employee almost never have a readily ascertainable value. See also Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.1001-1(a) and 1.453-6(a)(2) (1967).
80. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1012.
81. The Code and Regulations are silent as to the manner of allocation. The gain
might be allocated by using the ratio of the basis of each item of property transferred
to the total basis of all the property, or the ratio might be based on fair market value
of the property rather than basis. There are no cases directly on point, although
Runkle v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 458 (1939), used basis to allocate gain on a
later sale of stock received in a § 351 transfer between long-term and short-term gain.
This seems erroneous because property with a high basis may have a low value, yet
the greatest portion of the gain will be allocated to this property if basis is used,
[ VOL. 21
TAX PROBLEMS
to it and the property transferred at the time the corporation was
organized. Since the taxpayer planning a later "sale" normally would
organize the corporation by transferring property as to which a
stepped-up basis was unimportant while holding back for future sale
the property as to which a stepped-up basis is desired, allocation of
the gain among all the properties could materially reduce the corpo-
ration's tax benefits. On the other hand, if the corporation is orga-
nized by transferring cash, and a single asset, such as land, is later
sold for future development by the corporation, there would be no
allocation of gain problem if the "sale" later is treated as a section
351 "boot" transfer.
While possible non-availability of the installment method and
possible basis allocation problems under a section 351 "boot" transfer
may remove some of the tax benefits from the "sale," the major
benefits are retained. This suggests the possibility of planning the
sale so that, even if section 351 later is held to apply, the corporate
notes will be considered "boot" rather than stock or securities. While
simple to state, this is difficult to accomplish because of the problems
in distinguishing between a debt instrument that constitutes a "se-
curity" and one that constitutes "other property."
In Revenue Ruling 56-30382 the Service held that notes ranging
in duration from two to four years, with an average duration of two
and one-half years, received by a parent corporation on the sale of
land to its subsidiary, constituted "other property." In this ruling
both the "seller" and the "buyer" were corporations. Consequently,
the same tax stakes were not involved as would be with an individual
seller. At least one of the tax motives for an individuars sale of prop-
erty to his controlled corporation is to withdraw future earnings as
capital gains rather than as dividends. The corporation obviously
did not have this motive since dividends, under section 243,8 would
have been taxed at an effective rate of roughly eight per cent,8
while the gain recognized on receipt of the notes was taxed at the
25 per cent capital gains rate. Nevertheless, the ruling states that
the subsidiary did plan to subdivide and sell the property, so ob-
taining a stepped-up basis was certainly an important motive for
casting the transaction as a taxable transfer. The sale produced
when in fact other property with a low basis and a high value may have permitted
the gain to be realized.
82. 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 193.
83. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 243.
84. Section 243 permits a corporation to exclude from gross income 85% of the
dividends it receives from other corporations. Hence only 15% of any dividend will
be taxed, and the 1956 corporate tax rates were 52%, resulting in the entire dividend
being taxed at an effective rate of roughly 8% (52% x 15%). Under present § 243, a




significantly greater tax benefits than if a non-taxable section 351
transfer bad been made, with the subsidiary then distributing its
development proceeds as dividends.85 Although the Service subse-
quently revoked Revenue Ruling 56-30311 and now refuses to issue
advance rulings on the "boot" question, 7 the ruling should retain con-
siderable precedential value because it was not revoked on sub-
stantive grounds. Instead, the revocation was made simply as a
matter of procedure when the Service announced that it would no
longer issue advance rulings on the securities question.8
In Revenue Ruling 59-9889 the Service held that bonds ranging
in duration from three to ten years, with an average duration of
six and one-half years, constituted "securities." Here, however, the
Service emphasized that the bonds were held by non-stockholders
and were secured by a mortgage on the corporate property. Also,
the ruling involved an "E" reorganization rather than a sale to a
controlled corporation.
Although these two rulings might indicate that two and one-half
year notes will be "boot," while six and one-half year notes will
constitute "securities," the problem is not that simple. As the Tax
Court has stated:
The test as to whether notes are securities is not a mechanical determi-
nation of the time period of the note. Though time is an imporant factor,
the controlling consideration is an over-all evaluation of the nature of the
debt, degree of participation and continuing interest in the business, the
extent of the proprietary interest compared with the similarity of the note
to a cash payment, the purpose of the advances, etc.90
Taxpayers generally have not met with a great deal of success in
pursuading courts that notes received in a purported sale actually
constitute section 351 "boot."91 On the other hand, cases abound
85. Each dollar of recovered basis on future sales by the subsidiary could be
received tax-free by the subsidiary and, in effect, would be taxed at the 25% capital
gains rate when distributed to the parent, leaving the parent with 750 out of each
dollar of stepped-up basis after taxes. Had the transfer been tax-free, the subsidiary
would have paid a tax of 520 (1956 rates) on each dollar received in excess of its
parent's basis for the property, and the parent would have paid roughly 80 in taxes,
after applying the § 243 exclusion, when the remaining 480 was distributed to it,
leaving about 39 0 after taxes.
86. Rev. Rul. 63-28, 1963-1 Cim. BULL. 76.
87. Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964-2 Cum. BuLL. 947.
88. Id.
89. 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 76.
90. Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 737, aff'd, 230 F.2d
555 (5th Cir. 1956).
91. See, e.g., Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.
1956), where this argument was dismissed by the court and the notes were considered
stock. But see Lloyd-Smith v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1941), where
the Commissioner successfully argued that two-year unsecured notes received in a
§ 351 transfer were "boot."
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under the reorganization provisions 92 in which courts have held that
corporate notes did not constitute "securities." However, in these
cases the parties, with that agility found so frequently in tax contro-
versies, have reversed the roles assumed in sales cases. The Commis-
sioner is seeking "other property" classification in order to make
section 354(a) 93 inapplicable to the reorganization and force the tax-
payer to recognize gain. The taxpayer is seeking "security" classifica-
tion to avoid recognition of gain. While it certainly can be argued
that the definition of "security" should remain the same no matter
which party is seeking that classification, the issue in the reorgani-
zation cases is whether the notes give their holders a sufficient
proprietary interest in the issuing corporation to satisfy the "conti-
nuity of interest '94 requirement of a tax-free reorganization. 9 While
some commentators have indicated that the "continuity of interest7"
doctrine could be a requirement of section 351,96 to date there are
no cases so holding. Consequently, it is not inconceivable that a
different test would be applied in a section 351 "security" case than
in a reorganization case,97 although the courts do not seem to have
done so.98
Ignoring this possible difference between a reorganization "se-
curity" question and a section 351 "security" question, it seems that
a corporate obligation is less likely to be considered a security if it
is of short duration, 9 is unsecured,'00 bears no interest,1 1 or bears
92. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 368.
93. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 354(a), provides in general that no gain or loss shall
be recognized if securities in a corporation that is a party to a reorganization are
exchanged for securities in that corporation, or in another corporation that is a party
to the reorganization.
94. For a succint definition of the "continuity of interest" requirement in a re-
organization, see Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
95. See, e.g., Neville Coke & Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.
1945).
96. B. BrrERx & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAmEOLDEnS 75-76 (2d ed. 1966).
97. For a plausible argument to the effect that, even within the reorganization area,
different tests should be applied in determining whether a note given up by a creditor
in a reorganization constitutes a security, than are applied in testing a note received
by the same creditor, see S. SuRREy & W. WAREN, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 1570
(1962).
98. Camp Wolters Enterprises v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 737, aff'd 230 F.2d 555
(5th Cir. 1956).
99. Turner v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962) (one-year notes held not
securities for § 351 purposes); Cortlandt Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937
(2d Cir. 1932) (notes of 14-month duration and less held not securities for reorgan-
ization purposes); Rev. Rul. 56-303, 1956-2- CUM. BuLL. 193 (notes with an average
duration of two and one-half years held not securities for § 351 purposes).
100. Lloyd-Smith v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1941). But see Camp
Wolters Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 737, aff'd, 230 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.
1956) (unsecured notes held securities).
101. Turner v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962).
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the earmarks of an installment sales contract rather than a note. 02
Of these factors, the duration of the note certainly seems to be the
most important. Thus an attorney, in handling a sale to a controlled
corporation, might use short-term notes in the hope that, even if the
sale is treated as a section 351 transfer, nevertheless the notes will
be considered "other property." In doing so, he would find support
in many reorganization cases and in Revenue Ruling 56-303,103 but it
certainly should be recognized that this factor alone will not control
the tax consequences of the transaction. The notes might be con-
sidered securities despite their short duration; the notes might be
ignored and the transaction treated as a contribution to capital1' 4 or,
as discussed below, the notes might be considered stock.
5. Stock or Securities?-If the taxpayer is unable to sustain his
argument that the notes constitute "other property," or if the facts
do not warrant even making such an argument, he still may contend
that the notes are securities rather than stock. The Commissioner
normally will contend that the notes are stock rather than either
"boot" or securities, because treating the notes as securities rather
than stock may not be quite so advantageous to the Government.
If the notes are considered securities, the corporation will not obtain
a stepped-up basis for the property received,105 the transferor having
recognized no gain on the transfer, 106 but the corporation will retain
its deduction for interest payments on the notes, 10 7 and payments of
principal will be taxable as capital gains to the transferor'0 8 (unless
section 1239 applies). However, if the notes are considered stock,
then not only will the corporation lose its stepped-up basis, but it
also will lose its interest deduction and payments of both interest
and principal will be taxed as dividends to the transferor, 10 9 to the
102. Brown v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 27 (1956).
103. 1956 Cum. BuLrL. 193.
104. See text accompanying notes 140-48 infra.
105. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 362(a).
106. INT. RyV. CoDE of 1954, § 351(a).
107. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 163; See Truck Terminals, Inc. v. Commissioner,
314 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1963).
108. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1232; See Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Commissioner,
48 T.C. 374 (1967). Under § 1232(a) (2) even principal payments made within six
months of the transfer will be taxed as long-term capital gains.
109. The payments will be a dividend either by directly applying §§ 301 and
316 or by treating the payments as stock redemptions that fail to qualify for capital
gains treatment under § 302(b)(1), (2), and (3). The courts generally have not
found it necessary to decide which theory applies. See, e.g., the decision in Gooding
Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956). The particular theory
could be important if the taxpayer disposes of all his stock in the corporation prior
to the last payment on the "note." In such a situation, if § 302 is the relevant theory,
the final payment on the note would terminate the taxpayer's entire interest in the cor-
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extent of the corporation's earnings and profits"0 (and earnings and
profits will be increased as a result of the corporation's loss of a
stepped-up basis). Thus it becomes extremely important to the seller,
if all else fails, to sustain an argument that the notes should be treated
as securities rather than stock. If successful he will at least have sal-
vaged his capital gain and the corporation's interest deduction.
The debt versus equity question has been the subject of innum-
erable cases, because the problem can arise in a number of ways
completely divorced from a sale transaction. The question may be
placed in issue when the corporation seeks a deduction for interest
payments on the "notes,""' when it uses a stepped-up basis on a
later sale of the property, 112 when the "debt" is discharged, 113 when
the "debt" becomes worthless and the holder seeks a bad-debt
deduction, 114 or when the "seller" treats the proceeds of the "sale"
as capital gains. 115 While the various settings in which the issue
may arise are numerous, the tests applied by the courts to resolve
the issue generally are the same.1 6 Consequently, the cases discussed
below are not limited to sales cases.
At various times courts have attempted to find a single factor that
would resolve, or at least be of primary importance in resolving, the
debt-equity problem. For a period of time 17 the ratio of debt to
equity seemed to be of paramount importance. Emphasis on this
particular factor, to the exclusion of others, evidently resulted from
the Supreme Court's observation in Kelley Co. v. Commissioner to the
effect that
poration and so should qualify for capital gains treatment under § 302(b) (3). If this
is correct, the note might even be prepaid. Also, if § 302 is the relevant theory, a
taxpayer might give all his stock in the corporation to his wife or children and then
cause the corporation to prepay the outstanding notes. Since § 302(c) permits waiver
of the family attribution rules, capital gains treatment might be obtained on the
prepaid principal, even though the notes were considered stock, because again the
shareholder's entire interest would be terminated. Section 302(c)(2)(B)(ii) might
apply to prevent waiver of the family attribution rules in this situation, however.
Also, the Commissioner would certainly look with disfavor on any such attempt and
could be expected to strongly argue that the § 301 theory should govern.
110. INT. RBv. CoDE of 1954, § 316.
111. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946). See also Mountain
States Steel Foundries v. Commissioner, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 306 (1959).
112. Gunn v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 424 (1955).
113. Jennings v. United States, 272 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1959).
114. Gilbert v. United States, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
115. Morgan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 881 (1958).
116. For a case in which three of the above problems existed and were resolved
by applying the same tests, see Perrault v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 439 (1955).
117. The period of time has been defined by one commentator as 1946-56. Caplin,




As material amounts of capital were invested in stock, we need not con-
sider the effect of extreme situations such as nominal stock investments
and an obviously excessive debt structure. 118
The Tax Court in particular seemed to place almost total reliance
on this factor in resolving debt-equity cases. Thus ratios from 12:1" 9
to 1250:1120 caused ostensible debt to be reclassified as equity. The
numerous "thin capitalization" cases have been exhaustively discussed
elsewhereml and will not be explored in detail here. It should be
pointed out, however, that excessive reliance on the debt-equity
ratio was not only unrealistic but also produced inconsistent results.
Thus in one case' 22 a ratio of 12:1 caused "debt" to be considered
stock, while in another case' 3 a ratio of 39:1 did not prevent debt
from being considered true debt rather than equity. Thus a test that
originated as an admirable effort to inject a modicum of certainty
into an uncertain field probably resulted in creating even more un-
certainty. Consequently, the Tax Court at least has clearly aban-
doned the debt-equity ratio as the talisman that will resolve debt-
equity cases and now views it simply as a single factor to be con-
sidered in conjunction with other factors. For example, in one recent
case'24 the Tax Court did not reclassify debt as equity despite a
ratio of 700:1.
More recently the Tax Court has been placing primary reliance on
"the intent of the parties." 25 Unfortunately, determining the parties'
intent is not really an independent test but is simply the end result
of applying the various factors that have always been applied by the
courts in determining whether debt actually constitutes equity for
tax purposes. Thus the important question to be discussed is what
factors will a court look to in determining the parties' intent (i.e., in
determining whether equity is masquerading as debt)?
While the form of the debt instrument is not controlling, it is ob-
vious that the instrument should have all the outward appearances
of true debt in order to withstand scrutiny by the Internal Revenue
Service. Thus adequate interest should be provided, there should be
a fixed maturity date, the maturity date should not be unreasonably
distant, the note language and book entries should indicate the exis-
tence of a debt, and the face amount of the debt should not exceed
118. 326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946).
119. Bachrach v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. .79 (1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.
1953).
120. Swoby Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 887 (1947).
121. See Caplin, supra note 117.
122. Bachrach v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 479 (1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.
1953).
123. Scott v. Commissioner, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1029 (1955).




the value of the property transferred to the corporation. In addition,
payment of principal and interest should not be contingent on the
corporation's future earnings, and the obligations should not be sub-
ordinated to the claims of general creditors. The last two factors
are particularly important. It becomes difficult to distinguish the
"debt" from stock if payment is dependent on the corporation's
future success or if payments can be made on the "debt" only after
satisfaction of "outside" creditors' claims. However, subordination
of the debt to the claims of a single creditor may not be fatal, if ob-
taining money from that creditor was necessary to continue the corpo-
ration's existence and if that creditor would not loan money without
subordination. Under these circumstances subordination becomes a
neutral factor and the existence of other factors will determine the
classification of the instrument.
1
2
In addition to the terms of the instrument (which the taxpayer's
attorney can, to some extent, control), other factors, if present, are
extremely helpful, although the attorney may have no control over
these factors. If income-producing property is transferred, such as
rental property, so that the corporation may pay the debt without
disposing of the transferred property, the debt is less likely to be
treated as stock. In Sun Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,12 7 the note
provided for no interest, the transferee made no down payment, and
the property transferred (a warehouse) was virtually the sole asset
of the corporation. Despite these equity indicia, the note was held
to be a valid debt, primarily because the warehouse was being leased
at the time of the sale and the debt could be discharged from the
rentals received. In Aqualane Shores, Inc. v. Commissioner,28 the
Sun Properties case was distinguished primarily on the point that
the property in Sun Properties was income producing.
The debt should not, if possible, be held in the same proportion
as the stock. This, of course, will be impossible if the corporation
has only a single shareholder, but it might be noted that even though
the disproportion is only among members of a single family, dis-
proportionate holding may still be helpful. For example, in Curry v.
Commissioner,1' members of a partnership transferred property to a
corporation in exchange for a note. The note and stock were held
by members of a single family but in disproportionate amounts (two
of the note-holding partners, for example, owned no stock in the
corporation although they were wives of two substantial stockhold-
ers). Despite the family relationship, the Tax Court placed consider-
126. Id.
127. 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955).
128. 269 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1959).
129. 43 T.C. 667 (1965).
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able reliance on the disproportionate ownership of stock and debt
in upholding the sale. On the other hand, in Zephyr Mills, Inc. v.
Commissioner,130 disproportionate holdings within a single family
were considered to be of no significance. It also should be noted
that disproportionate holdings, even outside a single family, will
not guarantee debt treatment. In Reed v. Commissioner,131 all of
the corporate debt was held by a 55 per cent shareholder. Share-
holders holding the other 45 per cent of the corporation's stock held
no debt but the debt nevertheless was considered equity.
The taxpayer's argument is further strengthened if the asset trans-
ferred is not the sole or primary asset of the corporation, and if the
business could be conducted without owning the transferred asset.
Thus it is preferable, if possible, to sell the asset to a corporation
which is a going concern. This primary asset factor has frequently
been relied upon by the Commissioner in land development cases
where a corporation was formed and, shortly thereafter, "purchased"
undeveloped land from its shareholders and proceeded to develop and
sell the land. Since the corporation was considered to be a "meaning-
less shell' without the land, the "sale" closely resembled a capital
transfer.132 On the other hand, taxpayers have occasionally been suc-
cessful despite the existence of this factor,133 although cases in which
taxpayers have successfully sold a primary asset to the corporation
did not involve land development.1
As previously discussed, "thin capitalization" is no longer the de-
termining factor it once was. Nevertheless, it obviously is helpful to
the taxpayer if the debt-equity ratio is not extremely high. While
numerous decisions discuss the debt-equity ratio, there has been little
discussion of the applicable rules in determining the amount of debt
and the amount of equity. It appears that courts ordinarily look to
the fair market value of property transferred in exchange for stock
(rather than the adjusted basis of that property or the stock's par
value) to determine the amount of equity. As far as debt is con-
cerned, the courts generally look to the face amount of the outstand-
ing debt. In most cases the courts have ignored debt owed to third
parties in determining the debt-equity ratio, although in at least one
case - the Tax Court has looked at the corporation's entire debt obli-
gations, including those owed to third parties, in determining whether
130. 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 794 (1959).
131. 242 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1957).
132. See, e.g., Aqualane Shores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1959).
133. Sun Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955).
134. But see Rev. Rul. 56-303, 1956-2 Cumr. BuLL. 193, revoked by, Rev. Rul. 63-28,
1963-1 Cu .BuLL. 76.
135. Dobkin v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 31 (1950).
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the corporation was thinly capitalized where the "outside" debt was
guaranteed by the stockholders.
It also should be noted that the courts, in viewing the fair market
value of property transferred, will look to intangible as well as tangi-
ble assets. Thus if the assets of a going business are sold to the
corporation, goodwill may exist and be acquired by the corporation.
This intangible asset may offset an otherwise high ratio of debt to
equity. In Perrault v. Commissioner,1' partnership assets were trans-
ferred to a controlled corporation and the debt-equity ratio, consider-
ing only the tangible assets, was 516:1. However, the Tax Court held
that the corporation was adequately capitalized when the substantial
goodwill acquired by the corporation was considered. Furthermore,
even where capitalization has been extremely thin, this has not auto-
matically caused debt to be considered equity,137 but neither has a
low ratio automatically prevented the debt from being considered
equity.13
8
Some factors that have been relied on in interest deduction or
bad debt cases are inapplicable to sales cases. For example, if the
corporation has been organized for some time and then distributes
debt obligations as dividends, the Commissioner has attempted to
treat the obligations as stock on the ground that there was no invest-
ment to permit the obligation to be considered debt.13 9 This factor
would not be present in a sales case where additional property ob-
viously must be transferred to the corporation in order to have the
sale.
On the basis of the above summary, it is apparent that no single
factor will resolve the debt-equity question. No factor has con-
sistently either caused debt to be considered equity or required
that debt be considered true debt. Nevertheless, the taxpayer ob-
viously is in a stronger position if he can combine as many favor-
able factors as possible in his sale, particularly when a valid busi-
ness purpose can be established for the existence of these factors.
C. Contribution to Capital
While section 351 has been the method most frequently used by
the Commissioner in combating sales to controlled corporations,
it is apparent from the above discussion that section 351 may be
inapplicable to a particular transaction for any number of reasons.
Thus the corporation might pay cash for the property, the seller
might not control the corporation within the meaning of section
136. 25 T.C. 439 (1955).
137. Morgan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 881 (1958).
138. Huffstutler v. Commissioner, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 1422 (1953) (5:1 ratio).
139. Kraft Food Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956).
1968 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
368(c), or the seller might own no stock at all in a corporation con-
trolled by his family members. In these and other circumstances
the Commissioner generally is precluded from using section 351 and
instead may contend that the "sale" actually constitutes a contribu-
tion to the corporation's capital coupled with a dividend distribu-
tion. If the Commissioner is successful, the corporation will lose its
stepped-up basis for the property140 and payments by the corporation
will be treated as dividends to the extent of its earnings and profits.141
The Commissioner will encounter the least difficulty with a contri-
bution to capital theory if the shareholder organizes the corporation
by contributing cash and, shortly thereafter, the corporation "buys"
property from the shareholder, using the cash received upon organi-
zation for the purchase. This method was unsuccessfully attempted
in one early case 142 and since that time most taxpayers have not been
quite so obvious. A more difficult question is presented when a corpo-
ration that is a going concern "purchases" property from a controlling
shareholder for cash or when a non-shareholder sells property to the
corporation, either for cash or notes.
As to the non-shareholder situation, it is clear that a contribution
to capital is not precluded simply by the fact that the seller is not a
shareholder. The Supreme Court has held that a non-shareholder
may make a contribution to capital,'143 and the 1954 Code recognizes
this fact.1 Of course the problem ordinarily will arise only if mem-
bers of the seller's family control the acquiring corporation. Other-
wise there would be little reason for a person to cast a contribution
to capital in the form of a sale. But where members of the "seller's"
family do control the corporation, the Commissioner has successfully
treated the "sale" as a contribution to capital. In Foresun, Inc. v.
Commissioner,145 a corporation controlled by the "seller's" husband
and other family members "purchased" real property from the tax-
payer by making a down payment of 25,000 dollars and giving a note
for 200,000 dollars. However, no payments were ever made on the
note; there were no valid business reasons for the "sale"; the corpo-
ration was thinly capitalized, and payments of principal and interest
on the note were subordinated to the claims of a first mortgage.
Under these circumstances, the Tax Court found that the "sale" con-
stituted a contribution to capital.
Despite the Foresun case, the Commissioner normally is not in a
particularly strong position when arguing that a sale by a non-share-
140. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 362(b).
141. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 301, 312.
142. Labrot v. Burnet, 57 F.2d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
143. Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950).
144. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 362(c)(1).
145. 41 T.C. 706 (1964).
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holder actually was a contribution to capital. Even when a family
member controls the corporation, few non-shareholders would be
willing to give away valuable property-most would insist on re-
ceiving a valid evidence of indebtedness and would fully enforce
their rights as creditors if the corporation could not make payments
on the indebtedness as called for. This intent, if proved, should per-
mit the note to be treated as true debt rather than equity.
Also, the Commissioner may encounter some conceptual difficulties
in properly classifying payment of principal and interest on the notes
if the seller owns no stock in the corporation and the sale is treated
as a contribution to capital. The term "dividend" is defined by the
Code as "a distribution of property made by a corporation to a share-
holder."...146 This problem was not encountered in Foresun because
no payments were made on the notes in that case.
While a non-shareholder normally is in a strong position, here, as
in the section 351 area, a transfer of all the seller's stock shortly
before the sale would not necessarily permit the seller to be con-
sidered a non-shareholder. For example, in Owen Company v. United
States,147 a father transferred a part of his stock to his sons in ex-
change for their corporate debentures, and transferred the remainder
of his stock to a trust. While the father consequently owned no
stock, the corporation nevertheless was denied a deduction for pay-
ments of interest to the father on the debentures received from his son.'
Where the "seller" is a controlling shareholder, the Commissioner's
contribution to capital argument becomes considerably stronger. There
is certainly nothing unusual about a shareholder contributing prop-
erty to his controlled corporation, and payments made by the corpo-
ration may be characterized as dividends whether cash is immedi-
ately paid or whether notes are given.
There have been comparatively few contribution to capital cases
involving attempted sales, although there are innumerable cases in-
volving "loans." Whether a sale or a loan is involved, the question of
whether a contribution to equity capital has in fact been made should
be governed by the same factors. The question is:
whether the so-called creditors placed their investment at the risk of the
business, or whether there was an intention that the alleged [debt] be
repaid in any event regardless of the fortunes of the enterprise.148
Factors relevant in answering this question generally are the same
as those involved when the question is "stock or security" under sec-
tion 351. If the form of the instrument indicates a true debt, if the
corporation's capital structure is not excessively "thin," and if prin-
146. INT. 1REv. CODE of 1954, § 301(a) (emphasis added).
147. 180 F. Supp. 369 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
148. Leach Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 563, 578-79 (1958).
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cipal and interest are payable in all events and are not subordinated
to the claims of general creditors, then the shareholder is in a strong
position on the contribution to capital question. This is particularly
true if the debt is not held pro-rata by the shareholders and if the
assets sold to the corporation are not absolutely necessary to the
conduct of business.
III. SALES AT A LosS-SECTION 267
As discussed above, the seller of property that has appreciated in
value is primarily seeking to give his controlled corporation a stepped-
up basis for the property while recognizing a capital gain. However,
there also are potential tax advantages to be derived from selling
property that has depreciated in value to a controlled corporation.
If the sale is recognized for tax purposes, the seller could take an
immediate deduction for the difference between his adjusted basis
for the property and the amount paid for it by the corporation.
149
This deduction would be capital or ordinary, depending on the nature
of the property transferred. By selling to a controlled corporation,
the seller retains substantial ownership of the property so that he or
the corporation may obtain the benefits of future value increases.
To some extent the problems with sales of potential loss property
are the same as with sales of appreciated property. If the Commis-
sioner can successfully bring the sale within section 351, the loss will
not be recognized, even if "boot" is received. However, the Com-
missioner is forced to rely on section 351 with sales of appreciated
property largely because section 1239-the only Code provision speci-
fically dealing with sales of such property to a controlled corporation
-has proved to be highly ineffectual. In the loss area, Congress has
enacted a much more potent provision to discourage such sales-
section 267 of the Internal Revenue Code. Consequently, the Com-
missioner seldom, if ever, must use section 351 to disallow a loss on
sales to controlled corporations.
Sections 267 and 1239 are superficially similar.150 Both sections
deny a tax benefit arising from sales to controlled corporations. How-
ever, section 1239 defines "control" as more than 80 per cent owner-
ship, while section 267 requires only 51 per cent ownership. In
determining whether these ownership requirements are satisfied, both
provisions look to the value of stock owned, not to the number of
shares.' 51 But section 267 treats an individual as owning stock owned
149. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 165, 1001.
150. Section 267, however, is not limited to sales to controlled corporations. It also
applies to sales between related individuals, related corporations, trusts and fiduciaries,
trusts and beneficiaries, etc. Also, § 267 is not limited to losses but also applies to
expenses and interest.
151. In connection with § 267, use of value rather than number of shares was
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by his brothers, sisters, wife, parents, and lineal descendants (whether
minors or adults). An individual also is treated as owning stock
owned by a trust or estate of which he is a beneficiary, a partnership
of which he is a member, or a corporation in which he is a share-
holder. As previously mentioned, section 1239 attributes only stock
owned by an individual's wife, minor children, and minor grand-
children. Finally, section 267 applies to both depreciable and non-
depreciable property while section 1239 is limited to depreciable
property.
The low control requirement, coupled with broad attribution rules,
has made section 267 a considerably more effective provision than
section 1239 and has largely eliminated the tax advantages from
sales of loss property to controlled corporations. Thus the uncertainty
that has arisen with sales of appreciated property is not present in the
loss area. Furthermore, the courts have not hesitated to construe the
provisions of section 267 liberally. Thus deductions have been denied
where the individuals in question held legal title to no stock in the
corporation but were regarded as the beneficial owners'1 (a concept
that has been rejected under section 1239)153 and where the seller, as a
result of the sale, lost control of the corporation.'5 The courts also
have literally construed section 267 when literal construction re-
sulted in denial of a deduction, even though the particular factual
situation was probably not the type situation Congress had in mind
when section 267 was enacted. For example, in Commissioner v.
Whitney,-5 a loss on a sale of property by a partnership consisting of
thirteen unrelated individuals was denied where the sellers collectively
controlled the purchasing corporation only by virtue of the partner-
ship attribution rules of section 267. Consequently, to the dismay of
many taxpayers, section 267 has proved to be a highly effective
provision in contrast to section 1239.
IV. StMMARY
Congress has given little help to the Commissioner in combating
sales of appreciated property to controlled corporations. Section 1239,
partly through its limited coverage and partly through court inter-
clearly the result of conscious thought on the part of Congress. As first passed by
the House, the predecessor of § 267 would have been based on number of shares but
this was changed by the Senate (although the change was described as "slight").
S. 1Es,. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1934).
152. Tri-Borough Transp. Corp. v. Commissioner, 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 105 (1947)
(title to the stock was held by a son and nephew of one of the individuals).
153. Drybrough v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1029, rev'd on other grounds, 376 F.2d
350 (6th Cir. 1967).
154. Drake, Inc. v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1944).
155. 169 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1948).
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pretation, has proved to be ineffective. As a result, the Commissioner
has been forced to resort to section 351 in an effort to inhibit sales
of appreciated property by controlling shareholders. However, section
351 was not enacted for this purpose and its terminology frequently
makes it inapplicable to a particular sale. Furthermore, even if section
351 applies there still remain troublesome questions as to whether
the consideration received constitutes stock, securities, or "boot." As
a result, there is presently a considerable degree of uncertainty as to
the tax consequences of a sale of appreciated property to a controlled
corporation.
By contrast, there is little question but that a loss on the sale of
property that has depreciated in value to a controlled corpora-
tion will be disallowed. This has resulted both from the broad
terminology of section 267, the counterpart of section 1239 in the
loss area, and also from the courts' willingness to construe section
267 in accord with the purpose for which the section was enacted.
The reasons for the differences in the broad terminology of section
267 and the limited terminology of section 1239 are not readily
discernible. Both provisions are aimed at what Congress evidently
considers tax abuse. Yet, having made its tax abuse determination,
Congress effectively dealt with that abuse in the area of losses on
sales to controlled corporations but merely made a passing sweep at
sales of appreciated property. It would appear that if Congress con-
siders sales of appreciated property to controlled corporations to be
an area of tax abuse, section 1239 should be amended by decreasing
the percentage ownership requirements to 51 per cent, by broadening
the attribution rules to include more family members as well as
trusts, partnerships, and controlled corporations, and also by making
the section applicable to non-depreciable property.
[ VOL. 21
